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ü Abstract
Basel  III  classifies  government  debt  as  risk  free  while  actual  interest  rates  in  the
European  Union  (EU)  show  large  differences  not  only  because  of  liquidity  but  mainly
because  of  the  risk  of  default,  as  also  reflected  in  credit  default  swaps.  IFRS  /  IASB
insists that there are risks involved indeed and that fair  value accounting applies, which
causes  bank  capital  to  collapse.  Speculation  sends  governments  and  banks  in  joint
distress.  Curiously  such  debt  defaults  may not  happen  so  that  creditors  do  not  need  to
cover  losses.  The  risk  premium then  becomes  a  reward  for  taking  a  risk  that  does  not
materialize.  Contagious  fears  create  risk  premia  that  destabilize  government  debts  and
national  economies. A solution is  to regard the risk premia as potential  redemption that
turns  into  actual  redemption when the  loan is  served to  maturity.  A EU law may make
this  mandatory without  serious  restrictions  to the  credit  market.  The rule  would be that
governments  under  threat  of  default  would  issue  only  annuity  loans  with  a  centrally
determined  rate  of  interest.  The  market  sentiment  of  increased  risk  then  shows  up  in
shorter maturities.  Governments that can borrow only at shorter maturities but at higher
annual  liquidity  requirements  meet  with  strong  incentives  to  better  manage  their
economies.  The  paper  investigates  the  conditions  involved.  An  important  distinction
appears to exists between the risk free rate, the credit default risk premium, the liquidity
premium and  a  stigma  factor.  While  much  of  the  debate  in  the  EU seems  to  be  about
reducing the risk premium, the distinction  between ex ante risk and ex post redemption
allows  to  identify  that  true  EU policy  costs  concern  irrational  stigma  factors.  Notably,
aversion  against  Southern  European  debt,  that  differs  from  the  risk  free  rate  and  the
default  risk  and  liquidity  premiums,  has  no  rational  base  but  can  persist  because  it  is
rewarded.
Introduction
When there is a climate of fear that a particular government may default on its debt then
this  affects  all  debt  of  that  government,  but  it  becomes  important  to  make  a  clear
distinction  between  the  stock  of  debt  (solvability)  and  the  new  issue  of  debt  in  the
running  year  (liquidity).  All  debt  seems  the  same  but  there  can  be  a  window  of
opportunity if  the  country hasn’t  actually  defaulted  yet.  The  country may try to honour
old debt and try to find ways to deal with the new issue of debt. Inclusion of the market
sentiment on the risk of default may still generate new loans instead of blocking them. A
rising rate of interest may actually help to reduce such fears. The key point is this: if one
manages to maintain the risk free rate  then the higher risk premium might also be used
as redemption.
Basel  III  still  classifies  government  debt  as  risk  free.  Elementary  finance  textbooks
decompose the rate  of interest  into a risk free part  and the risk premium, at  least  in the
Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM),  see  Bodie  &  Merton  (1998)  or  Luenberger
(1998). In CAPM, government debt is regarded as risk free.
Actual  interest  rates  in the  EU show large differences  not  only because of liquidity  but
mainly  because  of  the  risk  of  default,  as  also  reflected  in  credit  default  swaps  (CDS).
The  IFRS  /  IASB  disagrees  with  Basel  III,  imposes  fair  value  accounting,  see  Selling
(2011). The lower value of government debt  causes bank capital  to collapse.  The credit
rating  agencies  have  become  very  active  in  downgrading  government  debt.  Some
institutes  like  pension  funds  can  be  required  to  sell  if  debt  is  no  longer  AAA.  The
banking  sector  appears  to  speculate  on  default  risks,  and  destabilizes  itself  in  that
manner.
For example, October 2011 gives a 10 year  bond rate  of 2% for  Germany and 18% for
Greece  so that  the  liquidity  and risk premium for  Greece  is  16%.  Greece  had a  haircut
indeed.  For  Portugal  the  rate  of  interest  is  11.7%  and  for  Italy  it  is  6%:  but  will  they
actually  default  ?  The  EU  is  working  hard  to  prevent  this.  Such  defaults  happen  only
rarely  so  that  creditors  do  not  need  to  cover  losses.  The  risk  premium then  becomes  a
reward for taking a risk that does not materialize. Contagious fears currently create risk
premia  that  destabilize  government  debts  and  national  economies,  while  they  increase
private  profits  where  those  are  not  urgently  needed.  Credit  default  swaps  have  been
invented by markets to both serve customers and own profits but the emphasis seems to
be  on  the  latter.  We  should  rather  be  looking  for  credit  non-default  swaps  (CNDS)  as
this is the most frequent situation for government debt.
A  solution  is  to  regard  the  risk  premia  on  new  debt  as  potential  redemption  that  turns
into actual  redemption when the  loan is  served to  maturity when the  risk thus  does not
materialize. A EU law may make this mandatory without serious restrictions to the credit
market.  The  idea  can  be  implemented  with  standard  annuities  rather  than  complex
instruments. Creditors can still insure themselves against actual default but will do so by
using both shorter duration and redemption in the annual payment. 
Delbecque (2011) also distinguishes the stock of debt and the issue of new debt, and also
proposes to  cap the  rate  of  interest  on only the  latter.  This  can be enhanced by turning
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the ex ante risk premium into ex post  redemption. We can also identify a stigma factor
that is implicit in many discussions.
We first look at the principle and then at the economic conditions that would be required
to  make  it  work.  The  idea  will  be  grasped  immediately  by  finance  experts  but  the
exposition  below  targets  first  year  students  and  might  perhaps  also  serve  Members  of
Parliament.  For  this  reason  we first  restate  the  simple  financial  mathematics  of  a  bond
issue with a fixed rate of interest. Colignatus (2011c) is an even lower level explanation
for a general public that has some acquaintance with mortgage or car loan annuities.
The  discussion  can  best  be  seen  in  the  context  of  Colignatus  (2011ab)  “An  economic
plan for  Europe”, see also Stavrou (2011). This plan is special  compared to other plans
in that it is based upon innovations in economic theory. The prime problems in this crisis
concern governance, investment and employment. Europe is fortunate,  with the German
anchor,  that  inflation  is  not  in  that  list.  As  explained  there,  part  of  the  old  Greek  and
Italian debt can be regarded as problematic for monetary stability and thus those can be
absorbed  within  the  monetary  system,  provided  that  those  governments  provide  some
collateral  to satisfy the no-bailout condition. This present discussion on new bond issue
is of secondary importance but helps to clarify some points.
Some authors propose Eurozone bonds to equalize rates of interest and diversify risks of
defaults. In my analysis it is better to use market signals on the performance and risk of
individual  governments.  There  is  also  the  issue  of  the  short  versus  the  long  term.  The
October  26-27 plan  to  have a  50% haircut  on  Greek debt  held  by private  agents  seems
unwise. The Treaty on the euro excludes bailouts and actually does not clearly deal with
defaults.  There have been serious policy errors made in the past. There is an alternative
to  that  October  26-27 approach.  See  that  “economic  plan  for  Europe”  for  measures  on
short  notice.  For  the  longer  term  the  Treaty  can  be  amended  for  defaults.  The  present
discussion is intended for that amendment. Generally a potential default will not concern
the whole debt but only a percentage - the haircut. When the haircut is applied to a bullet
bond  it  can  also  be  treated  as  an  annuity  -  which  then  would  have  been  the  better
instrument in the first  place. The new Treaty could include a “ladder” with increasingly
stricter conditions for bonds with interest rates that rise above the norm.
We  use  Cool  (1999)  “The  Economics  Pack.  Applications  of  Mathematica”  for  our
formulas.
Data
The  ECB  (2011a)  gives  “the  latest  available  harmonised  long-term  interest  rates  for
assessing  convergence  among  the  EU  Member  States.  The  rates  are  secondary  market
yields  of  government  bonds  with  a  remaining  maturity  close  to  ten  years.”  See
Appendix  A.  The  ECB  calculation  just  gives  the  internal  rate  of  return  on  observed
market values, and thus does not estimate expectations on a haircut, the yield-to-maturity
ISMA  formula  6.3,  see  ECB  (2003:10).  Government  debt  of  different  countries  may
have different  risk free values because of the liquidity premium that comes from having
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a smaller or  less  transparant  market. As said,  October  2011 gives an annual  rate  of 2%
for  Germany.  The  overall  liquidity  premium  may  be  estimated  as  the  difference  in
October  2010 between Germany 2.35% and  Holland 2.58% or  Finland  2.63% and thus
as 0.25%. It does not seem correct to use other countries since then this would be part of
a risk premium again. Hence we will use the overall risk free rate of 2.25%. Greece with
18%  has  become  a  complex  example  since  there  is  an  actual  haircut.  Italy  is  a  more
pressing example since it  has not defaulted yet and it  has a window of opportunity. For
Italy the rate in October is 6% and thus the risk premium is 3.75%. 
Our main interests are Germany and the Eurozone average. See Appendix B for the euro
yield  curve.  Judging  by  the  euro  yield  curve  the  average  rate  of  interest  for  10  year
Eurozone debt  still  is  fair  at  2.72% on average, ECB (2011b) and Eurostat  (2011).  The
increased sense of risk with respect to Southern Europe apparently has a limited impact
on  the  average.  The  rate  of  interest  for  German government debt  at  2% is  so  low (the
same as the inflation target, though I would advise 0% inflation, see elsewhere) because
risk averse creditors flee from Southern Europe. Southern Europe still  attracts  funds, so
it  mainly  is  a  redistribution.  The  apparent  average  of  2.72%  is  0.5%  higher  than  the
2.25%.  Given  the  limited  impact  of  current  fears  it  seems  fair  to  take  the  regulatory
target rate indeed as 2.25% (Germany + 0.25%) rather than 2.75% (Germany + 0.25% +
0.5%).
Debt and redemption
Notation
The assumption of a flat (constant) rate of interest suffices to explain the mechanism.
We  assume a  sequence  of  equal  periods  with  a  well  defined  periodical  payment  and  a
final  payment  at  maturity,  with  all  payments  at  the  end  of  the  period.  We  use  the
following symbols:
   †  r rate of interest per period (coupon rate i) 
   †  m maturity (number of periods)
   †  p instalment or periodical payment
   †  w payment at maturity (principal, worth)
   †  v present value (capital equivalent at the beginning)
Cashflow object
The basic object is a cash flow of p per period, for m periods, and a final payment of w.
In effect,  someone has borrowed w, pays periodic interest  p at the coupon interest  rate i
=  p / w, and returns the loan at maturity m.
example = {p Æ 10 Euro/Year, m Æ 10 Year, w Æ 100 Euro}; 
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CashFlow[p, m, w] /. example
CashFlow
10 Euro
Year
, 10 Year, 100 Euro
A  bullet  (bullit)  loan  has  annual  interest  payment  at  rate  i  without  redemption,  and  at
maturity the redemption of the principal.
Bullit[i / Year, m, w] /. example
CashFlow
100 Euro i
Year
, 10 Year, 100 Euro
Present value
The Present Value differs from the principal if the coupon rate i differs from the market
rate  r.  With  a  cash  flow  of  p[t]  per  period,  we  can  discount  each  payment  with  a
discount  factor  
1
H1 + rLt .  Since  we  assume  equal  payments,  p[t]  =  p,  we  can  add  all
discount factors:
total[r_, m_]  =  Sum[1 / (1+r)^t,  {t, m}] 
Hr + 1L-m HHr + 1Lm - 1L
r
capital == PV[Bullit[i, m, w], r]
capital 
i w H1 - Hr + 1L-mL
r
+ w Hr + 1L-m
Greek debt example
The  18%  rate  for  Greece  mentioned  in  the  introduction  need  not  actually  be  paid  by
Greece in an actual new loan now, but has been calculated by the ECB from debt values
on the secondary market. For example, Greece 5 years ago in 2006 may have had a bond
issue with a maturity of 15 years at 4% (ECB website). This bond now has a maturity of
10 years and is sold on the secondary markets. If there is no default or haircut, this bond
would  trade  above its  principal  value  of  100  since  the  coupon  rate  of  4% is  above the
current risk free rate of 2.25%.
value@0, NoDefaultD == PV@Bullit@.04, 10, 100D, .0225D
valueH0, NoDefaultL  115.516
The calculated yield of 18% for the old bonds implies that the ECB apparently observes
market  values  of  37% of  the  principal  of  100.  The  ECB calculates  the  internal  rate  of
return,  and from that  we recover the apparently observed market value. The calculation
of the implied 18% does not include an estimate on a haircut (and a premature end of the
loan).
value@0D == PV@Bullit@.04, 10, 100D, .18D
valueH0L  37.0828
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Annuity table
Suppose you borrow capital  v now. Without  intermediate  interest  payments, you would
have  to  repay  f  v  with  factor  f  =  H1+ rLm  at  maturity.  Suppose  that  you  only  pay  w  at
maturity. Then the remainder f v - w must be paid as interest or redemption in the period
before. If the periodical payment is constant then it is called an annuity. A table contains
payments of interest and amortisation, and remaining debt.
Suppose that a person is willing to pay an annuity of 30 per year for a period of 3 years,
and an additional final sum of 100 at the end of those 3 years as well. When the rate of
interest is 10% then the present value is almost 150. 
Present value = 149.737
period payment interest redemption debt
1 30.00 14.97 15.03 134.71
2 30.00 13.47 16.53 118.18
3 30.00 11.82 18.18 100.00
Haircut on a bullet loan
This is the formula for the remaining debt in an annuity scheme with annual payment p,
number of paid payments n, principal w and rate of interest r, say for n = 3:
remainder 
p
r
- Hr + 1L3
p
r
- w
The formula can be understood as borrowing a perpetuity value p / r and putting a part p
/ r - w into an account earning interest.
Consider a bullet loan that after three years is hit by a haircut h on the principal w:
p
r + 1
+
p
Hr + 1L2
+
p + H1 - hLw
Hr + 1L3
The haircut in year 3 can be seen as generating a remainder of an annuity scheme after 3
years:
H1 - hLw
p
r
- Hr + 1L3
p
r
- w
For example, a principal of w = 100, r = 2.25% and a payment of 18%:
::hØ-
Ir2 + 3 r + 3M Hr w - pL
w
>>
Result ê. 8w Æ 100, p Æ 18, r Æ .0225<
88hØ 0.483211<<
We check  that  this  haircut  on  the  bullet  loan  gives  the  proper  present  value  (at  2.25%
instead of 18%):
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pr + 1
+
p
Hr + 1L2
+
p + H1 - hLw
Hr + 1L3
ê. Result@@1DD ê. 8w Æ 100, p Æ 18, r Æ .0225<
100.
Example for Greek debt
Existing Greek debt from 5 years ago that gives 4% apparently has an implied haircut of
around 70% when we assume that this takes place at year 2 or 3:
SolveB37.0828 ==
p
r + 1
+
p + H1 - hLw
Hr + 1L2
ê. 8w Æ 100, p Æ 4, r Æ .0225<, hF
88hØ 0.693197<<
SolveB
37.0828 ==
p
r + 1
+
p
Hr + 1L2
+
p + H1 - hLw
Hr + 1L3
ê. 8w Æ 100, p Æ 4, r Æ .0225<, hF
88hØ 0.726294<<
The new mechanism
We assume the situation that old debt is redeemed in full, but that the country has to deal
with  fears  about  default,  that  it  meets when issueing new debt.  Greece  crossed  the  line
but Italy still has a window of opportunity. We can use the current Greek data (18%) as
theoretical values and the Italian data (6%) as practical values.
The new mechanism is to turn an ex ante risk premium into an ex post redemption if the
risk does not materialize. Alternatively put: the debtor pays the high annual payment but
if one succeeds in repaying the loan then one gets a refund.
In effect,  the  original  bullet  bond can be recalculated  as  an annuity bond.  The  new EU
law  then  would  be  that  governments  under  threat  of  default  would  issue  only  annuity
loans. While creditor and debtor can in principle bargain on the rates of interest and risk,
a  regulator  may  cap  the  rate  of  interest  to  eliminate  one  degree  of  freedom.  This
regulation  may  be  a  mere  law  with  no  strings  attached.  See  the  section  below  on
regulation.
Assume  a  5  year  loan  of  100  (million  or  billion)  at  2.25%  interest  for  risk  free
governments.  Let  the  risk  premium be  15.75%  for  a  government  at  risk,  in  total  18%.
These  Greek  values  are  purely  theoretical  since  Greek  will  not  be  able  to  issue  a  loan
like this.
Viewpoint  1:  The  rate  of  interest  consists  of  “risk  free  rate  plus  risk  premium”.  The
bullet bond would be like this, and the present value is determined with 18%. 
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Present value = 100.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 18.00 18.00 0.00 100.00
2 18.00 18.00 0.00 100.00
3 18.00 18.00 0.00 100.00
4 18.00 18.00 0.00 100.00
5 18.00 18.00 0.00 100.00
Viewpoint 2: When discounted with the risk free rate of 2.25% the present value is 174.
For  example,  if  the  creditor  lives  in  a  country  where  2.25%  is  the  norm  then  the
extraction  of  a  bond  with  18%  translates  into  an  immediate  profit  of  74  (million  or
billion). The profit of course is balanced with the risk of default.
PV@CashFlow@18, 5, 100D, 0.0225D
173.701
What about that risk of default ? After 5 years roughly 80% of the loan will be repaid. If
the  loan  is  served  to  maturity  then  the  risk  does  not  materialize.  Under  the  new
mechanism  the  risk  premium  payments  can  be  counted  as  redemption.  Effectively  the
calculation  gives  an  annuity  table.  At  maturity  a  remaining  debt  of  17.63  has  to  be
redeemed instead of the bullet value of 100. The present value is now determined using
the risk free rate of 2.25%. Note that the 51.68 value in the third year is consistent with
the haircut of 0.4832 that we calculated above in the formula section.
Present value = 100.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 18.00 2.25 15.75 84.25
2 18.00 1.90 16.10 68.15
3 18.00 1.53 16.47 51.68
4 18.00 1.16 16.84 34.84
5 18.00 0.78 17.22 17.63
Compare the two payment tables. At the end of year 2 almost 30% has been repaid and
at the end of year 3 almost 50% has been repaid. Suppose there is a default around year
3 in  the  bullet  bond. The  risk premium will  be  based upon fears  about  both  the  size of
the  potential  haircut  and  the  moment  when  it  might  occur.  In  this  case,  an  implied
haircut  of 80% over 5 years puts a ceiling on the expectations.  NB. The haircut  applies
to the bullet format and not to the annuity format - see the section on regulation below.
Thus,  when the  risk  free  rate  is  given,  the  risk  premium affects  maturity.  If  the  risk  of
default  is  judged  to  be  large,  the  creditor  will  agree  only  with  shorter  maturities.  At
renewal of the loan, the risk can be smaller, resulting in a longer maturity, or the risk can
be higher, resulting in an even shorter maturity.
The  proposed  scheme  limits  the  scope  for  creditors  to  diversify  risks.  In  the  present
situation a creditor  might collect  risk premia from say 10 customers to cover the actual
default  of  1  of  them.  Good  customers  effectively  pay  the  redemption  of  the  failing
customer. Customers can have different rates of interest including risk premia depending
upon risk status.  A bit  irrational:  a customer with high risk may pay a higher premium,
enlarging  the  risk,  and,  when  the  risk  does  not  materialize,  this  weaker  customer
contributes  most  to  the  redemption  of  the  customer  who  fails.  In  the  new situation  the
rates  of  interest  and  risk  are  (in  principle)  both  negotiated  between creditor  and debtor
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on  an  individual  basis.  If  the  risk  materializes  then  there  might  be  a  subsequent
negotiation  on  the  size  of  the  haircut,  while  the  creditor  could  still  recover  possible
losses from overall proceeds from various customers.
The  creditor  can  still  diversify  the  risk  of  default  by  taking  a  portfolio  of  different
maturities. Here it is important that the loans start in different years so that redemption is
collected over different periods. In the example above, suppose that 1/5th is kept of each
of  these  lines.  The  first  redemption  cashed  in  the  first  tranche  is  balanced  by  a  much
larger redemption cashed over time in the last  tranche.  On average a “risk premium” of
about  40%  is  cashed  and  thus  a  haircut  of  about  40% can  be  carried  on  similar  bullet
bonds.  With  such  a  haircut  on  a  bullet  the  creditor  still  enjoys  the  normal  risk  free
earnings on interest. (Let us call this the “non-losing haircut”.)
The  debtor  can  negotiate  for  a  lower  rate  of  interest  or  a  longer  period  by  offering
collateral. Credit default swaps should rather be forbidden since they create the sense of
security associated with money, which is the monopoly of the Central Bank.
This example used figures taken from Greece, though it is a complexer example since it
already  took  a  haircut  on  existing  debt.  It  is  more  practical  to  look  at  Italy  that  still
honours its stock of debt.
Application to Germany and Italy
Suppose that Italy takes a loan of 10,000 million euro for  10 years. Markets in October
demanded  6%.  The  present  value  taken  at  the  risk  free  German  rate  of  2%  plus  the
liquidity  premium of  0.25%  amounts  to  13.3  billion.  Italy thus  pays  a  risk  premium of
3.3 billion, or 33% in total, above the annual reward of 2.25%.
PV@CashFlow@600, 10, 10 000D, 0.0225D
13 324.8
If the bullet loan were discounted at 6% then of course the present value again is 10,000.
Creditors will like us to think that we have to use 6% instead of 2.25%.
Present value = 10 000.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
2 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
3 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
4 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
5 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
6 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
7 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
8 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
9 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
10 600.00 600.00 0.00 10000.00
The ex ante risk premium for Italy can be regarded as ex post redemption, if the loan is
served to maturity. The annuity scheme uses 2.25% and the final future value is 5846, so
that  halfway  about  2000  is  redeemed.  For  a  portfolio  of  different  maturities  the  non-
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losing haircut would still be 20%.
Present value = 10 000.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 600.00 225.00 375.00 9625.00
2 600.00 216.56 383.44 9241.56
3 600.00 207.94 392.06 8849.50
4 600.00 199.11 400.89 8448.61
5 600.00 190.09 409.91 8038.71
6 600.00 180.87 419.13 7619.58
7 600.00 171.44 428.56 7191.02
8 600.00 161.80 438.20 6752.81
9 600.00 151.94 448.06 6304.75
10 600.00 141.86 458.14 5846.61
Thus  there  are  two  properties:  (1)  With  a  proper  monetary  and  financial  management,
that risk need not materialize, and creditors  cash a 33% surplus profit.  (2)  If the risk of
default  would  materialize  in  a  haircut  of  20%  then  creditors  do  not  actually  lose
anything either  since they are compensated as in an annuity scheme, and also rewarded
with the German risk free rate plus the liquidity premium.
This scheme of translating  premium into redemption looks decidedly simpler than what
the Eurozone has concocted till now, see the critical Cabral (2011) and Hau (2011).
The  problem  is  not  just  Italy  but  also  the  Treaty  on  the  euro.  Elementary  finance
textbooks  assume that  debt  can  be  discounted  with  an  overall  (world)  market  risk  free
rate  but  somehow in  the  Eurozone its  governments have lost  the  ability  to  impose this.
See the section below on regulation.
If the risk free rate would be imposed, fears on defaulting translate into shorter maturity
and higher  redemption.  A higher  annuity  causes  more distress  for  a  government that  is
already  short  in  funds.  The  advantage  however  is  that  the  horizon  becomes  shorter,
while  the  effective  rate  of  interest  is  under  regulation  from  a  central  regulator.  This
current  rate  of 6% seems rather  excessive and it  derives mainly from the present crisis,
while  a  revised  Treaty  on  the  euro  will  have  more  balancing  rules  in  an  earlier  stage.
The regulator  in  a revised Treaty  (see  below) would start  with  such 2.25% but  when it
appears  that  new loans  are  made to  cover  payments  on  older  loans,  then  it  could  raise
that  rate.  The  regulated  rate  namely  controls  the  real  losses  suffered  by  the  regulated
government.
Stigma
The proposed scheme relies on the strict difference between the market risk free rate and
the  risk  premium,  as  used  in  finance  textbooks  and  CAPM.  We  allowed  for  a  third
aspect  of  market  liquidity,  meaning  that  German  bonds  may  sell  easier  because  of  a
better developed market. There may also be a fourth factor, call it stigma, or bear market
sentiment  or  country  aversion,  so  that  a  country  may fall  prey  to  speculations  on  such
sentiments. Such a stigma effect can be the only explanation why investors might require
a rate  of  interest  for  Italy that  is  higher than 2.25% even when the  risk of  default  does
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not materialize. 
Assume an Italian market stigma of 2%. Then the Italian interest rate rises to 4.25% and
the scheme to turn the ex ante risk premium into ex post redemption becomes as follows.
Italy  has  to  pay  7874  at  maturity,  and  thus  loses  about  2,000  million  in  future  value
(compared  to  the  scheme  above)  because  investors  have  lost  trust  and  speculators  fuel
that. This is an irrational sentiment in the market but it becomes rational again because it
is rewarded by higher proceeds.
Present value = 10 000.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 600.00 425.00 175.00 9825.00
2 600.00 417.56 182.44 9642.56
3 600.00 409.81 190.19 9452.37
4 600.00 401.73 198.27 9254.10
5 600.00 393.30 206.70 9047.40
6 600.00 384.51 215.49 8831.91
7 600.00 375.36 224.64 8607.27
8 600.00 365.81 234.19 8373.08
9 600.00 355.86 244.14 8128.93
10 600.00 345.48 254.52 7874.41
Suppose  that  Italy  would  be  able  to  reduce  stigma  to  1%.  Then  the  6%  annuity  might
reduce  to  4% and the  interest  rate  would reduce  to  3.25%.  Italy saves  on  liquidity  200
per annum but has a future final payment of 9130 that is higher than the 7874. Overall it
saves the 1%.
Present value = 10 000.
period payment interest redemption debt
1 400.00 325.00 75.00 9925.00
2 400.00 322.56 77.44 9847.56
3 400.00 320.05 79.95 9767.61
4 400.00 317.45 82.55 9685.06
5 400.00 314.76 85.24 9599.82
6 400.00 311.99 88.01 9511.81
7 400.00 309.13 90.87 9420.95
8 400.00 306.18 93.82 9327.13
9 400.00 303.13 96.87 9230.26
10 400.00 299.98 100.02 9130.24
Summary on the kind of submarkets
Thus we have these submarkets: 
(1) The risk free rate including liquidity premium.
(2) Perceived but false default  risk for government debt, that can be handled by annuity
schemes. Haircuts on bullets are paid via redemption in annuities.
(3) Stigma (a) that contributes to (2), and (b) that raises the discount rate in the annuity
scheme in (1). If stigma is not clearly recognised then it may cause that the rate of (2) is
used in (1) too.
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(4)  True  risk  premium  as  normally  for  companies  in  the  CAPM  but  now  also  for
government debt  that  can default  in  full  (also in  annuity  form).  This  risk is  covered by
portfolios (but not in discounting with (1)).
Texts  from  the  realm  of  (4)  apparently  have  confused  discussions  about  (1)  and  (2),
causing (3) as well. Markets apparently benefit from that confusion.
In October Portugal’s 10 year rate was 11.7%. On November 24 Fitch reduced it to junk
status,  with  a  further  rise  to  12.1%.  It  does  not  imply  that  a  default  is  in  scope.  On
November 29 the Italian rate  was 7.56%, and now indeed on new loans and not merely
inferred  from  old  debt.  It  could  switch  to  annuities  and  fully  redeem  debts,  but  with
shorter maturities (and likely liquidity assistance). 
Contagion to bank capital
The  case  of  Greece  helps  to  highlight  another  effect.  The  rise  to  18%  restricts  Greece
from issueing new debt.  It cannot  impose the risk free rate  used in the annuity scheme,
as  explained  above.  Instead,  it  has  to  rely  on  funds  from  the  EU  and  the  IMF,  who
require  austerity.  This  is  one  effect.  The  other  effect  is  dat  banks  holding  Greek  debt
lose  value.  The  rise  of  rates  and  the  actual  Greek  default  have  consequences  for  bank
capital.
Let  us  review what  we determined  in  the  section  on  formulas  above.  The  18% rate  for
Greece  need  not  actually  be  paid  by  Greece  now,  in  an  actual  new  loan,  but  has  been
calculated by the ECB from the value of debt on the secondary market. As said, Greece
5 years ago in 2006 may have had a bond issue with a maturity of 15 years at 4%. This
bond now has a maturity of 10 years and is sold on the secondary markets. If there is no
default  or  haircut,  this  bond  would  trade  above  its  principal  value  of  100  since  the
coupon rate of 4% is above the current 2.25%.
value@0, NoDefaultD == PV@Bullit@.04, 10, 100D, .0225D
valueH0, NoDefaultL  115.516
The  ECB  calculated  a  yield  of  18%  for  the  old  bonds,  which  implies  that  the  traded
value must be 37% of the principal of 100. 
value@0D == PV@Bullit@.04, 10, 100D, .18D
valueH0L  37.0828
Last  year  this  same  bond  traded  at  a  higher  value.  We  take  the  ECB  10  year  rate  of
October  last  year  of  9.57%,  again  assuming  no  haircut  in  the  estimate.  Apparently  the
bond traded at 63% of principal.
value@-1D == PV@Bullit@.04, 11, 100D, .0957D
valueH-1L  63.0951
The  IFRS  /  IASB  rules  require  fair  value  accounting  by  banks.  When  banks  holding
Greek debt lose value on it, say from 63.1 to 37.1, they have to account for it. This debt
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is  a  liability  to  them,  and  the  loss  directly  translates  in  their  capital  and  equity  value.
Other  agents  are  affected  that  hold  paper  from such  banks.  The  government debt  crisis
becomes a bank crisis (again).
The markets have different  agents.  The  seller  takes a loss  in  the  hope to  avert  a bigger
loss,  the  buyer hopes  to  make a  profit  on  a  lesser  haircut.  Some pension  funds  may be
forced to sell because of regulations that they use only debt with a certain credit rating.
A speculator  who buys above bond at  37.1 from a  pension  fund in  distress,  and  sees  a
lesser  haircut,  gains.  Apparently  fair  value  accounting  does  not  allow  to  specify  such
speculative expectations, possibly since that speculator is in the shadow banking system.
Earlier, we concluded that the 18% would be a surplus profit due to speculation. Now it
appears  a  loss  to  banks,  due  to  expectations  on  default.  What  is  it,  a  profit  or  a  loss  ?
Clearly it is confusing as well that the ECB publishes a rate of interest of which we may
assume that it does not include a haircut while market sentiments can include a haircut. 
The point remains that Greece is stuck. If it issues a bond at the current 18% in the bullet
format  and  works  hard  to  prevent  a  default,  then  creditors  would  make  a  huge  profit.
Greece can only arrive at a decent rate by conforming to market sentiments and actually
default  on  that  bullet  -  which  is  what  governments  are  supposed  not  to  do.  It  is  rather
perverse  that  a  speculator  could  buy  at  37.1  and  insist  that  Greece  works  hard  to  not
default, after which the speculator gets 115.5.
In fact,  Greece  should  buy back its  own bonds and  make that  profit  itself.  Hufbauer  &
Kirkegaard (2011) explain that angle. The problem is that Greece doesn’t have the funds
for that buyback. Haufler et al. (2011) state the viewpoint by German economists: other
states should not help Greece in this bailout. Currently Greece is being bailed out partly
nevertheless.  Suppose  that  it  wants  to  do  more,  on  itself.  One  option  is  to  guarantee
precedence  to  buyers  of  new  bonds  over  holders  of  older  debt.  This  however  will  not
really work since these will be the same creditors. It is better to honour old debt and then
use the new debt creatively.
A  response  by  Greece  could  be  to  actually  conform  to  such  market  expectations  on
defaulting, by issueing a bond that has a probability of defaulting. For example, in year 2
part of the issue is recalled with probability Pr and fully redeemed, and the remainder is
recalled in year 3 and given a haircut.  If the 18% reflects  market sentiments then it  can
become the coupon rate, while the present value at the risk free rate of 2.25% gives the
announced haircut  value of 81%, if Pr = 50% and using a random generator from some
independent regulator.
w == Pr
p
r + 1
+
p + w
Hr + 1L2
+ H1 - PrL
p
r + 1
+
p
Hr + 1L2
+
p + H1 - hLw
Hr + 1L3
ê.
8w Æ 100, p Æ 18, r Æ .0225<
100  H0.935427 H100 H1 - hL + 18L + 34.8205L H1 - PrL + 130.468 Pr
Solve@Result ê. Pr Æ 0.5, hD
88hØ 0.808922<<
One would not  suggest such a  scheme for  Italy since  the  implied risk of  default  is  still
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low. But for  Greece  it  might be considered.  If a haircut  is  expected,  the auction master
can make the expectations explicit, and separate those fears from the risk free rate.
Thus there are various subtle effects, but overall the conclusion is warranted that current
procedures allow too much scope for some actors in the financial world to make surplus
profit.
Stigma may consist to some extent out of the contagion discussed here. That is, creditors
may require 18% not only to cover the direct default risk but also the indirect effects on
other  paper  that  they  have,  e.g.  on  shares  of  banks  holding  Greek  debt  or  shares  of
companies  in  Greece.  I  tend  to  think  that  this  need  not  be  so.  Supposedly  it  could  be
possible to separate the direct and indirect effects. 
It  may  be  that  the  IFRS  /  IASB  rules  do  not  fully  account  for  the  pecularities  of  the
Eurozone. Since IFRS / IASB allow model exercises,  it might be looked into that banks
report  on  their  estimate  of  an  actual  government  debt  default.  The  difference  between
this  and  the  estimate  of  the  market  value  of  the  debt  would  given  a  value  for  stigma.
Perhaps this already happens ?
To regulate or not to regulate
For new regulation the important issue is the cost at the EU level. There are three kinds
of regulated markets that all assume no-bailouts, such that the member state faces issues
of haircuts itself, and there is a fourth one with a bailout.
(1)  The  EU-costless  but  uncapped  market.  The  new  law  only  states  that
unmaterialized  risk  is  translated  into  an  annuity.  Creditor  and  debtor  negotiate  in
advance  about  the  split  in  risk  free  rate  and  risk  premium.  Stigma  effects  cannot  be
avoided.  In the  current  situation  it  must be doubted  however whether  the  Greek stigma
really causes a true total rate of interest  of 18%. Stigma may be lower at 3% so that the
rest is redemption.
(2)  The  EU-costless  but  capped  market.  The  new  law  also  instructs  the  regulator  to
cap the rate of interest, either with rules or discretion. The cap would consist of the risk
free rate (Germany) plus the liquidity premium plus a tolerable  level of stigma, say 2%
as  when  entering  the  Eurozone.  Long  government  debt  is  a  prime  method  to  bring
stability to pension funds, and a somewhat higher rate of interest  is merely another way
of providing for pensions and thus need not be a cause for alarm. It would be interesting
to see what the maturity would be if stigma is set at zero, and whether Greece would be
able to  raise  sufficient  funds.  Without  learning,  the  cap would be exactly at  the market
value  (case  1)  to  generate  sufficient  funds.  But  there  may also  be  learning  effects  that
allow a  lower  stigma to  sink  in.  The  country  itself  may make costs  to  achieve  a  lower
stigma but it would be EU-costless.
In this way there would be scope for a EU regulator to oversee the rate of interest  for a
member government that threatens to become in default. The 10 year German rate of 2%
would not be affected  by this  since Germany does not accept  more risk in this  scheme,
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and  since  the  problem  country  remains  responsible  for  its  own  debt.  The  problem
country  pays  a  price  since  the  10  year  German  rate  may  become  its  own  6  year  rate.
There  is  benefit  in regulation and capping that  rate,  since it  blocks somewhat irrational
effects of private profit taking in current financial markets.
(3) The EU-costly and capped market. Regulation would likely become costly if there
is a common policy to drive down stigma. Suppose that the regulator caps stigma to 1%
while  the  market  rate  would  be  3%.  It  depends  upon  the  supply  schedule  but  say  that
Greece then only covers 30% of its demand for funds. It would need 70% of funds from
non-market sources.  Here ideas on adaptation of the European Central  Bank (ECB), the
introduction  of  Eurozone  bonds,  or  the  extension  of  the  European  Financial  Stability
Fund (EFSF) enter the discussion.  Those ideas can be confusing when also bailouts  are
covered that actually belong to the following.
(4)  The  EU-costly  and  capped  market  with  bailout.  The  notion  of  a  bailout  causes
more integration than only regulation of trade flows. The prime example is the Eurozone
bond backed by the whole Eurozone. It presumes some fiscal union, since otherwise the
fund would be powerless if some country would default. 
With  these  4  possibilities  we  can  imagine  a  “regulation  ladder”  with  regime  switches,
first  how to  get  to  a  stable  situation,  and  secondly  how that  stable  situation  looks like.
See the next section.
With this analysis  it  appears  that much debate  in the EU seemed to be about regulating
default  risk while it  actually was about  regulating irrational  market stigma that fuels on
itself since it is rewarded. Of course, some were discussing the fiscal union, but many of
those discussants may have lacked a clear view on stigma.
It is a bit sobering that all this discussion in the EU about the Greek haircut, first of 21%
in July (now adopted by Parliaments) and then of 50% last October 2011 (still pending),
essentially  boils  down to  swap a  bullet  into  an annuity  scheme,  plus  the  willingness  to
cap  the  effective  rate  of  interest  to  the  market  risk  free  rate.  That  is,  the  discussion  in
2011 about  Greece  concerned  a  haircut  on  old  debt,  but  this  situation  could  have been
avoided if  one  had discussed  this  swap some years  earlier.  The  lesson  is  useful  for  the
treatment of other countries in Southern Europe.
The literature shows the awareness of herd behaviour (indeed bears and bulls in general)
yet the matter becomes a bit clearer when it is seen in the context of turning ex ante risk
into  ex  post  redemption.  It  allows  us  to  better  evaluate  the  role  of  the  ECB.  The  ECB
decided to buy Southern European debt on the secondary market. The given argument of
supporting the financial  stability of the South and the system as a whole is vague when
there  would be no fundamental  risk for  default  - it  should have sufficed  to point  to the
fundamental  factors.  The  traditional  notion  of  a  liquidity  crisis  now  becomes  clearer.
The  proper  motivation  rather  lies  in  the  desire  to  fight  suddenly  high  market  stigma
when  the  fundamental  belief  is  that  there  is  no  cause  for  default.  We  now  understand
that the ECB actually wanted to cap the risk free rate in the annuity scheme. It currently
lacks that option and the market operation was a second best,  i.e.  the traditional  way to
bring  down  the  rate  of  interest.  This  method  suits  a  monetary  and  fiscal  union  but  is
inadequate for  the Eurozone setting.  Adaptation of the ECB and the Treaty on the euro
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seems  wise.  Countries  can  do  a  lot  themselves  about  reducing  stigma  but  joining  a
monetary union eliminates an instrument (primarily printing money, but perhaps also the
exchange rate  but  that  generates  another  risk  factor)  to  handle  stigma and  thus  there  is
some responsibility for the union to assist. 
A regulation ladder
We get a ladder  with a yardstick, and distinguish the end result  and the process  how to
get there.
PM.  It  is  a  curious  system  that  private  banks  can  borrow  from  the  ECB  at  1%,  use  a
multiplier,  and  loan  to  governments at  18%.  In normal  situations  we  would  like  to  see
governments  benefitting  from seigniorage,  see  Colignatus  (2005),  and  banks  having  to
compete for funds in the market place, rather than the other way around. The target rate
of interest  would be about the same as the nominal GDP growth, thus r º g, since then
income and wealth would be balanced. With the long term rate anchored in that manner,
the  weight  for  inflation  policy  falls  on  the  short  term  rate  of  interest,  hence  the  term
structure,  influencing  bank  profits  based  upon  their  channelling  of  short  term  deposits
into long term loans.
A yardstick
The regulator can let  itself  be guided by a formula to establish the rate of interest  to be
used in  the  annuity  scheme of  a  government at  risk of  default.  With  d the  Debt  /  GDP
ratio the rate could be r = 1.25 + c Hd - 60L, both in percentages, with coefficient c. At d =
60 we have r = 2.25. The coefficient 1.25 could change if the fundamental (German) rate
of  2  rises.  We  can  distinguish  operations  in  the  normal  state  around  d  =  60,  with
coefficient c = 1.05, and the current period of crisis with coefficient c = 1.01. The latter
form can  provide  stability  for  the  adjustment  in  the  next  decade.  Once  debt  values  are
sustainable then the regime switch from recovery to normality takes place.
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The long term situation
In the long term countries would be in these states:
(1) Stability around d = 60 and the deficit at most 3%.
(2) Warning phase, when d ¥ 80 and possibly r ¥ 3.9.
1.25 + 1.05 ^ H80 - 60L
3.9033
The  country  is  obliged  to  use  annuity  schemes  so  that  market  sentiments  translate  into
maturity. The regulator assists in capping the rate of interest. It can use discretion. If the
country  is  cooperative  then  the  cap  could  be  at  2.25  but  otherwise  it  might rise  with  d
according to above formula or worse.
The  cap  can  be  implemented  in  various  ways.  The  most  natural  seems  to  be  the
following. The annuity bond of principal P can be backed by a P by the regulator and (1
-  a)  P  by  the  country,  say  for  a  =  30%  during  30%  of  the  start  of  its  life.  No  doubt
market parties will design schemes to split the insurances, if needed, but this is OK since
it will provide information about the perceived risks. 
Countries can apply for this phase voluntarily at lower debt levels too. For example, at a
debt level of 75% the markets might cause a rate of interest of say 5.5% and there would
be  a  perverse  temptation  for  the  country  to  let  debt  rise  to  80%.  Presumably  though
instruments are developed to better identify stigma and true fears about defaults.
(3) Danger zone, for d ¥ 85 and r ¥ 4.6.
1.25 + 1.05 ^ H85 - 60L
4.63635
Market  perceptions  threaten  to  develop  into  high  stigma  and  perceived  risks  on
defaulting even on the annuity payments. The regulator may still cap the rate of interest
to only 2.25% if the country behaves but may also choose for example 5% if it doesn’t.
The  formula  is  only  indicative.  It  may  be  necessary  that  the  loans  run  fully  via  the
regulator (not only a = 1 but also the annual payments) who then recovers the sums from
the  country.  The  regulator  may  use  25  year  loans  in  these  bilateral  dealings  with  the
country. Collateral will be involved as well.
(4) No more support, for d ¥ 90 and r ¥ 5.5.
1.25 + 1.05 ^ H90 - 60L
5.57194
The regulator  has  been signalling to  the market via the  earlier  steps that  debt  from this
country  is  getting  risky.  Market  parties  have  been  able  to  sell  their  holdings.  The  low
price  of  the  debt  causes  an  ever  shorter  maturity  of  its  annuity  loans.  Beyond  90%  of
GDP  it  is  over.  The  regulator  starts  selling  its  own  debt  to  recover  part  of  it,  while
maintaining a claim on the country for the remainder.
The country is still in the Eurozone. Though it no longer gets financial support from the
regulator, it still has some minimal advantages of the whole system on liquidity. In phase
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(3)  one  cannot  use  bonds  that  explicitly  state  a  probability  of  default  but  now  one  is
obliged to do so (see the example above).
(5) Exit, for d ¥ X.
It is a matter of taste whether one wishes to specify an exit rule. If a large group wishes
to impose an exit of a single member then it could always enforce it. Thus there does not
seem to be a need to do so.
How to get there
The process on getting there can be described as stage (3) above but now with c = 1.01,
and Greece perhaps now at  180% debt of GDP. Greece would be allowed to use bonds
that specify a probability of defaulting, using a random generator of a trusted source. If
Greece succeeds in reducing its debt then the rate could be 2.25% but it can be higher if
the regulator thinks so. If the debt has been reduced to 85% then c flips to 1.05.
1.25 + 1.01 ^ H180 - 60L
4.55039
The approach suggested here can already be started.  Apparently the regulator  is not the
ECB but  the  EFSF.  See  Delbecque  (2011)  for  a  proposal  how the  EFSF could  cap  the
rate of interest on new debt, and a short exchange of views with De Grauwe on the stock
versus  new  debt.  This  does  not  yet  identify  stigma  and  the  option  to  turn  ex  ante  risk
premium into ex post redemption via annuities. The EFSF runs to 2013 and is supposed
to be replaced by a permanent ESM. It seems wiser to make the ECB a full lender of last
resort without discussion about legality.
Again,  this  discussion  can  best  be  seen  in  the  context  of  Colignatus  (2011ab).  Stress
tests  would  enhance  our  information  about  the  system  performance.  There  should  be
provisions to change the ladder in a stress situation for example due to climate change.
Other literature on stigma
Armentier  et  al.  (2011)  discuss  Discount  Window  stigma  (DW-stigma)  when  banks
prefer not to borrow cheaper at the US FED for fear that it signals to others that they are
vulnerable.  IMF (2011)  accounts  for  that  kind of  stigma too.  When the  ECB buys debt
from specific  countries  it  has  a  similar  signalling  effect,  such  that  rate  of  interest  need
not reduced as much as hoped for. This is just one kind of stigma and not the only kind.
Efrat (2005) indeed gives another example, and discusses how bankruptcy used to affect
enterpreneurs  in the  past  more than nowadays.  Erb et  al.  (1997) discuss  country risk in
global financial management. Apparently stigma must be implied but they do not specify
stigma in the terms discussed here. 
In  the  literature  on  Eurozone  bonds  there  are  ample  references  to  speculation  but  not
using  the  label  “stigma”.  That  literature  tends  to  carry  a  confusion  of  stigma  with  the
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real  risk  of  default.  Eurozone  bonds  destroy  the  information  about  individual
performance, which information is useful to generate shorter maturities for governments
under  distress.  Some  comments  on  such  bonds  can  be  made  here.  There  are  various
models  for  such  bonds.  If  all  countries  use  only  Eurozone  bonds  then  Germany would
see a rise of its rate from 2% to say the 2.75% average. The liquidity premium of 0.25%
would disappear, but the extra risk factor has to be included that there no longer is a safe
haven in Germany since it  has taken along the load of other nations.  Though one might
argue that  it  already has taken on that  load anyway. Countries may also only partly use
Eurozone  bonds,  e.g.  the  first  60%  of  debt.  The  German  Five  Wise  (Bofinger  et  al.
(2011))  propose  a  once-only  redemption  for  debt  above  60%,  financed  by  a  Eurozone
instrument. Overall, a partial  application is better than a full one. However, setting up a
temporary and/or partial system for Eurozone bonds has the risk that the mechanism gets
known and becomes permanent. 
The slides  by Bini Smaghi (2011) are informative about  the issues in the Eurozone. He
is aware of speculation but does not formulate the issue in terms of stigma, and does not
sharply formulate a stand against surplus profits made when defaults do not materialize.
He glosses  over  the  issue  of  inflation,  and  does  not  see  these  two points:  (a)  Liquidity
support for Eurozone government debt need not fuel inflation.  (b) The critical  overhang
of Greece and Italy can be neutralised within the monetary system.
Teulings  et  al.  (2011),  in  a  book  on  the  current  crisis  for  the  general  public  by  the
director  and  some  colleagues  of  the  Dutch  Central  Planning  Bureau  (CPB),  implicitly
discuss stigma processes though they do not use the term. Their  discussion can be seen
as  traditional.  There  is  the  distinction  between  liquidity  and  solvency  crises.  In  a
liquidity  crisis  the  EU  and  ECB  could  support  the  affected  government  since  the  no-
bailout condition is satisfied, though there are restrictions in the Treaty. The higher rates
of interest  still  would have to be paid to the creditors,  and thus not just  the overall risk
free rate  of 2.25%. In a solvency crisis  the  debt  must be restructured  with a haircut  for
creditors. In the latter case there is a bailout and the Eurozone would surely need a new
Treaty and have to turn into a fiscal union. The latter would overall be useful to prevent
that a liquidity crisis turns into a solvency crisis. There is also the problem of contagion
that bad government debt affects the capital base of banks, so that oversight of banks at
the EU level is required as well. This traditional view neglects that a fiscal union is only
a sufficient  but not a necessary condition. Necessary is only that exchange rate changes
are  replaced  by  another  control  mechanism  on  trade  flows,  not  necessarily  on  other
issues  than  trade  flows.  The  CPB is  a  strong  supporter  of  the  aggressive  Dutch  export
policy but it neglects that this is part of the problem, see Colignatus (2011d) on the ghost
of the Berlin  Wall.  The view neither  criticizes  the surplus  profits  made from high rates
of  interest  due  to  stigma,  i.e.  “risk  premia”  for  risks  that  do  not  materialize.  It  does
neither  recognize  that  a  restructuring  of  the  Greek  and  Italian  debt  can  be  absorbed  in
the monetary system, as suggested in Colignatus (2011ab). The CPB is also silent on the
following. The Dutch minister of Finance, De Jager, called for a Greek haircut, with the
argument  that  the  banking  sector  should  carry  part  of  the  burden.  This  worsened  the
situation  in  the EU because of  the higher rates  and the  contagion towards  bank capital.
He actually  called  for  a  “bank run”,  and encouraged  stigma by confirming the  reaction
pattern  of  the  markets instead  of  discouraging it.  Instead,  Colignatus  (2011ab)  contains
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additional  bank  capital,  using  public  funds,  which  both  enhances  solvency  and  implies
that the banking sector carries part of the burden because of the loss of equity value.
Papademos  (2011),  before  becoming  prime  minister  of  Greece,  presents  the  traditional
view too. 
Mosler (2011) formalizes the common notion that debt is only delayed taxation but then
radically interpretes debt as money too: “The new bond issue includes an addition to the
default provisions that eliminates the risk of loss to investors. The language added to the
default  provisions  states  that  while  in  default,  and  only  in  the  case  of  default,  these
transferable  securities  can be used directly,  by the bearer on demand, at face value plus
accrued  interest,  for  payment  of  any  debts,  including  taxes,  owed  to  the  Greek
government. By eliminating the  risk  of  loss,  Greece  will  be  able  to  independently  fund
all  required  financial  obligations  in  the  market  place  for  the  foreseeable  future.  The
immediate benefits are both reduced interest costs that substantially contribute to deficit
reduction, and the elimination of the need for the funding assistance from the European
Union  and  the  IMF.” In  current  practice,  debt  has  a  structure  such  that  debt  cannot  be
used to  pay for  taxes,  and creditors  are  paid  for  not  doing so.  If there  is  a  true default,
then  such  debt  would  not  be  accepted  as  payment  for  taxes  either,  since  the  country
would be in dire straits and need all cash it can get. The latter however would not change
whatever  the  default  provision  text  says,  even  though  Mosler  hopes  to  the  contrary.
There is also the Eurozone setting. It is unlikely that Greece can print  100% of GDP of
these bonds, and then default, such that such bonds turn into money useful to pay Greek
taxes, without the ECB protesting that it is creating money outside of the agreed system
parameters.  For  Mosler  there  is  no  difference  between  money  and  debt  but  in  some
minds  there  still  is,  and  likely  also  in  the  minds  of  a  defaulting  government.  Mosler
implicitly  wants  to  reduce  the  stigma effect  and  the  ex  ante  expectation  of  default  that
does not materialize (otherwise the scheme would not work).
The  Shadow Financial  Regulatory Committees (2011)  run the  risk of  being as  shadow-
confused as the Eurozone itself,  though in the comfort zone of having no responsibility
in this (other than educating students).  That is, one does not read anything here that for
example Kanzler  Merkel hasn’t  heard from her advisors either.  In that  respect  it  can be
read as  a  summary of various  challenges  for  policy making, but  it  is  vague, unspecific,
focusses on the impossibilities  and leaves out important  options.  The exception may be
the proposal on page 3 on a new rule: “including a simple, but ample, minimum required
leverage ratio – shareholders’ equity divided by total assets” but this causes all kinds of
questions.  Perhaps  one  becomes  a  “shadow  regulator”  by  developing  views  on  the
“capital  requirement  ratio”  (while  the  main  problem  are  shadow-banks).  The  chairman
Benink (2011)  in  a Dutch text  holds that  ECB activities  require  capital,  and that  losses
are at the cost of governments and taxpayers. He then refers to current rules and forgets
to add that monetary economics advises a change of the Treaty.
A note on CAPM
One  way  how  the  rate  of  interest  can  rise  for  a  country  in  distress  is  by  shortselling.
Colignatus  (1999)  contains  a  note  on  shortselling  in  the  CAPM. In an email  of  August
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13 1999 Zvi Bodie reacted: “The point you are making is quite correct. It was first made
years  ago  by  Robert  C.  Merton  in  his  pathbreaking  work  on  the  intertemporal  capital
asset  pricing model. You can find all  the relevant articles  reproduced in Merton’s  book
“Continuous time finance”.” Note that Bodie may have reacted only to the summary and
need not have studied my full paper. I have not pursued the issue further. The interested
reader has two references now.
Conclusion
It  is  useful  to  see  the  issue  at  the  level  of  the  EU  and  not  just  the  Eurozone.  We  can
identify  perverse  processes  that  put  governments  into  costs  with  perceived  profits  for
banks but also with bank capital  losses.  Perhaps the bank problem requires  special  new
regulation  but  at  least  we  have  succeeded  in  better  understanding  stigma  and  haircuts.
The proposed scheme has these features:
(1)  We  can  identify  a  regulatory  ladder  with  different  phases,  and  distinguish  the  end
result and the process how to get there.
(2) In the “normal” situation around the Debt / GDP norm of 60% countries pursue their
own debt policies.
(3) If a country comes from the normal situation of Debt / GDP around 60% into another
situation  higher  than  say  80%,  it  can  be  declared  under  threat  of  stigma  or  default.  It
then  issues  new  debt  in  annuity  forms  where  the  rate  of  interest  is  establised  by  the
regulator. 
(4) In the current situation, where various EU member states have high government debt
and are perceived to be under threat  of default,  already (3) applies.  An interest  rate cap
is required to allow recovery from the rather severe crisis we are in. Healthy people can
sustain brisk measures but  patients  in hospitals  need careful  treatment. The EU-costless
scheme is to require a lower rate by law. This does not put a burden on safe countries. It
only  regulates  the  interaction  of  markets  and  problem countries,  by  reducing  irrational
and counterproductive  feedback loops.  Creditors  like pension funds can be educated on
this. Other creditors may resist such law however, remain stuck in stigma, refuse to lend,
so that liquidity support is needed.
(5)  The  identification  of  the  stigma  effect  and  counterproductive  market  processes
requires  reevaluation  of the  Treaty on the  euro.  Regulation with EU-costs may actually
be  desirable  to  block  rather  than  only  reduce  such  counterproductive  processes.  This
view supports  the earlier  conclusion in Colignatus  (2011ab)  that  it  would be better  that
the EU as a whole gets a proper system of central banks without issues of legitimacy.
Our  discussion  overlaps  much  of  what  already  has  been  said  about  the  distinction
between liquidity and solvency crises.  Our discussion  however helped to better  identify
the  stigma  effect  and  the  counterproductive  market  processes,  and  we  suggested  the
regulation ladder to deal with these.
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Appendix A: EU 10 Year Interest Rates
ECB  (2011a),  “Long-term  interest  rate  statistics  for  EU  Member  States”,
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html
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Appendix B: Euro Yield Curve
ECB (2011b), “Euro yield curve”, http://www.ecb.de/stats/money/yc/html/index.en.html
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